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Abstract—Although shill bidding is a common auction
fraud, it is however very tough to detect. Due to the un-
availability and lack of training data, in this study, we build
a high-quality labeled shill bidding dataset based on recently
collected auctions from eBay. Labeling shill biding instances
with multidimensional features is a critical phase for the
fraud classification task. For this purpose, we introduce a
new approach to systematically label the fraud data with
the help of the hierarchical clustering CURE that returns
remarkable results as illustrated in the experiments.
I. INTRODUCTION
The last three decades witnessed a significant increase in
exchanging goods and services over the Web. According to
the World Trade Organization, the worldwide merchandise
during the period 1995-2015 was over 18 billion 1. Online
auctions are a very profitable e-commerce application. In
2017, eBay claimed that the net revenue reached 9.7 billion
US dollars, and the number of active users hit 170 million
2. Regardless of their popularity, e-auctions remain very
vulnerable to cyber-crimes. The high anonymity of users,
low fees of auction services and flexibility of bidding
make auctions a great incubator for fraudulent activities.
The Internet Crime Complain Center (IC3) announced that
auction fraud is one of the top cyber-crimes [1]. As an
example, the complaints about auction fraud in only three
states, California, Florida and New York, reached 7,448
in 2016 [1]. Fraudsters can commit three types of fraud,
which are pre-auction fraud, such as auctioning of black
market merchandise, in-auction fraud that occurs during
the bidding time, such as Shill Bidding (SB), and post-
auction fraud, such as fees stacking. Our primary focus is
on SB whose goal is to increase the profits of sellers. SB
does not leave any concrete evidence unlike the two other
fraud. Indeed, buyers are not even aware that they have
been overcharged.
Identifying relevant SB strategies, determining robust
SB metrics, preprocessing commercial auction data, and
finally evaluation the SB metrics based on the extracted
data make the study of SB fraud very challenging. In addi-
tion, labeling SB instances with multidimensional features
is a critical phase for the classification models. In the
literature, labeling training data is usually done manually
by the domain experts, which is quite a laborious task and
is prone to errors too. Due to the unavailability and lack
of labeled SB training datasets, the main contribution of
this paper is to produce high-quality labeled SB data based
1https://www.wto.org/english/res e/statis e/its2015 e/its2015 e.pdf
2https://www.statista.com
on commercial auction transactions that we have extracted
lately and preprocessed [2]. As illustrated in Figure 1, we
introduce a new approach to systematically label SB data
with the help of data clustering. This approach consists of
splitting first the SB dataset into several subsets according
to the different bidding durations.
Since hierarchical clustering is significantly preferable
over partitioning clustering and provides a higher quality
of clusters, we applied the Clustering Using Representa-
tives (CURE) technique to produce the best differentiation
between normal and suspicious bidders. CURE [3] has
been proved over the years to be a very efficient clus-
tering method for large-scale training datasets in terms
of the cluster quality and outlier elimination. Hierarchical
clustering has been practiced successfully in numerous
fraud studies [4], [5]. The resulting labeled SB dataset can
be employed by the state-of-the-art classification methods.
Furthermore, the accuracy of new predictive models can
also be tested using our SB training dataset.
II. SHILL BIDDING OVERVIEW
SB is a well-known auction fraud, and yet it is the most
difficult to detect since it behaves similarly to normal bid-
ding [6], [4]. It aim is to increase the price or desirability
of the auctioned item. In other words, the objective of
a shill bidder is not to win the auction but to raise the
revenue of the seller. SB leads buyers to overpay for the
items, especially for high priced items. Thus, e-auctions
may lose their credibility [6]. In Table I, we highlight the
most relevant SB patterns [7]. Each pattern, representing
a classification feature, provides a unique aspect of the
bidding behaviour, which is very important for building
robust fraud classifiers.
III. PRODUCTION OF SHILL BIDDING DATA FROM
ONLINE AUCTIONS
A. Auction Data Extraction and Preprocessing
To obtain a reliable SB training dataset, it must be
built from actual auction data. Nevertheless, producing
high quality auction data is itself a burdensome operation
due to the difficulty of collecting data from auction sites
on one hand, and the challenging task of preprocessing
the raw data on the other hand. The latter consumes
a significant time and effort, around 60% to 80% of
the entire workload [8]. In our previous study [2] , we
employed the professional scraper Octopars 3 to collect
a large number of auctions for one of the most popular
3https://www.octoparse.com
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Figure 1. The Labeling Process of the SB Training Dataset
Table I
SB PATTERNS AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS
Name Definition Category Source
Bidder
Tendency
(BT)
Participates exclusively in
auctions of few sellers rather
than a diversified lot
Bidder User
history
Bidding
Ratio (BR)
Participates more frequently
to raise the auction price
Bid Bidding
period
Successive
Outbid-
ding (SO)
Successively outbids himself
even though he is the current
winner
Bid Bidding
period
Last
Bidding
(LB)
Becomes inactive at the last
stage to avoid winning
Bid Last
bidding
stage
Early Bid-
ding (EB)
Tends to bid pretty early in
the auction to get users at-
tention
Bid Early
bidding
stage
Winning
Ratio
(WR)
Competes in many auctions
but hardly wins any auctions
Bidder User
history
Auction
Bids (AB)
Tends to have a much higher
number of bids than the aver-
age of bids in auction dataset
Auction Auction
history
Auction
Starting
Price
(ASP)
Offers a small starting price
to attract genuine bidders
Auction Auction
history
products on eBay. The extracted dataset contains all the
information related to auctions, bids and bidders. We
crawled completed auctions of the iPhone 7 for three
months (March to June 2017). We chose iPhone 7 because
it may have attracted malicious moneymakers due to the
following facts:
• Its auctions attracted a high number of bidders and
bids.
• It has a good price range with the average of $610.17
(US currency). Indeed, there is a direct relationship
between SB fraud and the auction price [9].
• The bidding duration varies between 1 (20.57%), 3
(23.2%), 5 (16.23%), 7 (38.3%) and 10 (1.7%) days.
In long duration, a dishonest bidder may easily mimic
usual bidding behaviour [9]. However, as claimed in
[10], fraudulent sellers may receive positive rating in
short duration. Thus, we considered both durations.
Table II presents the statistics after preprocessing the
scraped auction data. This operation was very time con-
suming as it required several manual operations [2]: 1)
removing redundant and inconsistent records, and also
records with missing bidder IDs; 2) merging several at-
tributes into a single one; 3) converting the format of sev-
eral attributes into a proper one; 4) assigning auction IDs.
For instance, Date and Time attributes in each auction are
converted into seconds; e.g. 1 day and 10 day durations are
converted into 86,400 and 864,000 seconds respectively.
Table II
PREPROCESSED AUCTIONS OF IPHONE 7
No. of Auctions 807
No. of Records 15145
No. of Bidder IDs 1054
No. of Seller IDs 647
Avg. Winning Price $ 578.64
Avg. Bidding Duration 7
No. of Attributes 12
The metrics of SB patterns are presented in [7], [2].
Each metric is scaled to the range of [0, 1]; a high value
indicates suspicious bidding behaviour. We computed each
metric against each bidder in each of the 807 auctions [2].
As a result, we obtained a SB training dataset with a total
of 6321 instances. Each instance denotes the conduct of a
bidder in a certain auction. An instance is a vector of 10
elements: Auction ID, Bidder ID and the eight SB features.
IV. HIERARCHICAL CLUSTERING OF SHILL BIDDING
DATA
Since SB data are not labeled, data clustering, an
unsupervised learning method, can be utilized to facilitate
the labeling task. Clustering is the process of isolating
instances into K groups based on their similarities. The
clustering techniques fall into one of the following cate-
gories: 1) Partitioning-based, such as K-medoids and K-
means; 2) Hierarchical-based, such as BIRCH, GRID-
CLUST and CURE; 3) Density-based, such as DBSCAN
and DBCLASD; 4) Grid-based, such as STING and
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CLIQUE. In our work, we select agglomerative (bottom-
top) Hierarchical Clustering (HC) where instances are
arranged in the form of a tree structure using a proximity
matrix.
A. CURE Overview
Among the hierarchical clustering methods, we choose
CURE because it is very performant in handling large-
scale multi-dimensional datasets, determines non-spherical
shapes of clusters, and efficiently eliminates outliers [3].
Random sampling and partitioning techniques are utilized
to handle the large-scale problem. Each selected instance
is first considered as an individual cluster, and the clusters
with the closest distance/similarity are integrated into a
final cluster [3]. Two novel strategies have been introduced
in CURE:
• Representative Points (RPs), which are selected data
points that define the cluster boundary. Instead of
using a centroid, clusters are identified by a fixed
number of RPs that are well scattered. Clusters with
the closest RPs are merged into one cluster. The
multiplicity of RPs allow CURE to obtain arbitrary
clustering shapes.
• Constant shrinking factor (α), which is utilized to
shrink the distance of RPs towards the centroid of the
cluster. This factor reduces noise and outliers.
The worst case time complexity of CURE is estimated
to O(N2 log N), which is high when N is large (N is
the number of instances) [11]. Since SB data clustering is
an offline operation, so the running time is not an issue.
The only disadvantage of CURE is that the two parameters
RP and α have to be set up by users. To run the exper-
iments, we utilize the Anaconda-Navigator environment
for running Python 3, and we integrate GitHub service to
incorporate the CURE program developed by Freddy Stein
and Zach Levonian 4.
B. SB Data Preparation
Since the bidding duration is used as a denominator in
EB and LB patterns, the large gap between different dura-
tions greatly affects the computation results. The pattern
value for 10 days is far smaller than for 1 day. So, before
applying CURE, we first partition the SB dataset into five
subsets according to the five durations (1, 3, 5, 7 and 10
days) as presented in Table III. We compute the Mean
and STandard Deviation (STD) of each subset, which will
4https://github.com/levoniaz/python-cure-
implementation/blob/master/cure.py
be individually passed into CURE for clustering along
with the best number of clusters. Here a cluster contains
instances/bidders with similar bidding behaviour.
Table III
SB DATASET PARTITIONING ACCORDING TO BIDDING DURATION
Partition 1 Day 3 Days 5 Days 7 Days 10 Days
Mean of each pattern per partition
BT 0.1434 0.1394 0.1419 0.1455 0.1162
BR 0.1287 0.1328 0.1235 0.1273 0.1021
SO 0.0996 0.1047 0.0872 0.1149 0.0620
LB 0.4624 0.4511 0.4676 0.4678 0.4746
EB 0.4314 0.4192 0.4318 0.4348 0.4575
WR 0.3812 0.3718 0.3810 0.3533 0.3496
AB 0.2120 0.1936 0.2403 0.2567 0.2926
ASP 0.5007 0.4301 0.4478 0.4801 0.7123
Avg. Means 0.2949 0.2802 0.2901 0.2975 0.3208
STD of each pattern per partition
BT 0.1973 0.1884 0.1984 0.2019 0.1811
BR 0.1246 0.1330 0.1243 0.1377 0.1165
SO 0.2764 0.2811 0.2583 0.2917 0.2215
LB 0.3773 0.3753 0.3917 0.3783 0.3931
EB 0.3775 0.3742 0.3921 0.3802 0.3968
WR 0.4356 0.4373 0.4402 0.4345 0.4398
AB 0.2323 0.2426 0.2646 0.2658 0.2575
ASP 0.4931 0.4831 0.4863 0.4908 0.4510
Avg. STDs 0.3142 0.3143 0.3194 0.3226 0.3071
C. Optimal Number of Clusters
It is always difficult to decide about the optimal number
of clusters. Besides, normal and shill bidder behaviour is
somehow similar. Thus, determining the best number of
clusters is an essential step to achieve a better interpreta-
tion for classifying similar SB instances [12]. There are
several methods to address this problem, such as Elbow,
Dendrogram, the Rule of Thumb and Silhouette. In our
study, we employ the Silhouette method where each group
is represented as a silhouette based on the separation
between instances and the cluster’s tightness [13]. The
construction of a silhouette requires the clustering tech-
nique to generate the partitions and also to collect all
approximates between instances [13]. K-mean clustering
algorithm has been successfully utilized for this task due to
its simplicity and effectiveness [12]. Therefore, we apply
K-mean to estimate the number of clusters for each of the
five SB subsets. Next, we examine the silhouette scores
for 19 clusters, and choose the best number based on the
best silhouette score. In Figure 2, we give an example for
the 7 day bidding duration. Instances are partitioned into
eight clusters since the highest silhouette score (0.4669) is
obtained on that number. In Table IV, we expose the best
number of clusters for each of the five SB subsets.
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Figure 2. Optimal number of clusters for 7 day bidding duration.
Silhouette score is examined 19 times. We show the top three Silhouette
scores.
Table IV
THE BEST NUMBER OF CLUSTERS FOR EACH SB SUBSET
Subset Number of Clusters
1 Day 7
3 Days 7
5 Days 5
7 Days 8
10 Days 2
Total 29
D. Cluster Generation
CURE has three parameters that need to be setup:
representative points, shrinking factor and optimal number
of clusters. Based on the results of silhouette, we obtain
the optimal number of clusters for each of the five SB
subsets. RPs and α are defined by selecting the setting that
provides the best instance distribution among the specified
clusters. Thus, CURE is applied with different RPs and α
parameters starting from the default values on the eight
clusters (see Table V).
Table VI
SB INSTANCES AND CURE CLASSIFICATION
AuctionID 900 900 2370 432 1370
BidderID z***z k***a g***r 0***0 o***-
BT 0.75 0.4705 0.8333 0.5 0.04615
BR 0.3461 0.3076 0.2 0.3333 0.0857
SO 1 0 1 0 0.5
LB 0.5667 0.1909 0.0350 0.2199 0.2966
EB 0.5409 0.1909 0.0239 0.0043 0.2060
WR 0.75 0.4 1 0.5 0
AB 0 0 0.3333 0 0.0526
ASP 0 0 0.9935 0 0
Label 1 0 1 0 0
V. LABELING SHILL BIDDING DATA
Algorithm 1 : Labeling Bidders in a Cluster
Require: Mean and STD of the corresponding subset
1: Compute MeanOfCluster
2: if (MeanOfCluster ≥ (Mean+ STD2 )) then
3: for x=1 to NumberOBiddersCluster do
4: LabelOfBidderx = 1 (Suspicious)
5: end for
6: else
7: for x=1 to NumberOfBiddersCluster do
8: LabelOfBidderx = 0 (Normal)
9: end for
10: end if
In algorithm 1, we show the steps to label the bidders of
a cluster. A cluster belongs to a certain subset. We consider
the value of Mean+ 12STD of the subset since it produces
the best decision line that separates between normal and
suspicious instances as depicted in Figure 3. The decision
line is defined by the average of the means and STDs of the
values of the SB patterns in that subset. So, if the mean of
the cluster is greater than the decision line, then instances
are labeled as suspicious (1) in that cluster; otherwise, they
are labeled normal (0). We also give an example in Table
VI where the bidders belong to the 7 Day subset. As we
can observe in this table, the shill bidding instances are
similar to the normal bidding instances, and our labeling
approach has successfully classified each instance.
Table VII provides all the best results of the clustering
and labeling of our SB dataset. There are 5646 instances
categorized as normal and 675 instances as suspicious. The
total number of produced clusters is 29.
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Table V
CURE CLUSTERING FOR 7 DAY BIDDING DURATION
RP α C#1 C#2 C#3 C#4 C#5 C#6 C#7 C#8
5 0.1 136 1438 1 2 657 190 2 1
5 0.05 657 328 2 1408 1 28 2 1
5 0.01 1438 640 1 1 17 1 1 328
5 0.001 21 166 2 1 2 25 2209 1
10 0.1 2 1 657 1410 22 8 137 190
10 0.05 2 133 2 1 2 31 2066 190
10 0.01 1 1 1 1 135 31 2067 190
10 0.001 189 654 1410 3 137 31 1 2
Figure 3. Labeling decision line of a cluster of a subset
Table VII
FINAL RESULTS OF CLUSTERING AND LABELING
Partitions 1
Day
3
Days
5
Days
7
Days
10
Days
Total
Auctions 166 187 131 309 14 807
Instances 1289 1408 1060 2427 137 6321
Clusters 7 7 5 8 2 29
RP 5 5 5 10 5 NA
α 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.001 0.1 NA
Normal 1135 1303 975 2098 135 5646
Suspicious 154 105 85 329 2 675
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
There are limited SB classification studies due to the
difficulty of identifying useful SB strategies in one hand,
and the unavailability of labeled training SB data on the
other hand. Producing and labeling SB training data are
both critical tasks for implementing SB classifiers. Our
aim is to effectively label SB data based on hierarchical
clustering. CURE has shown a remarkable capability for
partitioning the behaviour of bidders. After data cluster-
ing, we automatically label each cluster with our own
approach. Our future work mainly concentrates on the
following work:
• The generated SB dataset is highly imbalanced,
which will negatively impact the performance of
classifiers as shown in [14]. The decision boundary of
the fraud classifiers will be biased towards the normal
class, which means suspicious bidders will poorly be
detected. Handling the class imbalance problem is a
continuous area of study [15]. In our research, we
will investigate this problem and test different types
of techniques, such as over-sampling, under-sampling
and cost-sensitive learning, to verify the most suitable
technique for our SB dataset.
• Ensemble learning has produced reliable classifica-
tion performance for numerous practical applications.
The objectives defined by ensemble learning are low-
ering the model’s error ratio, avoiding the overfitting
problem, and reducing the bias and variance errors.
The most common ensemble methods are Boosting
and Bootstrap Aggregation (Bagging). Thus, we will
employ the ensemble learning to implement a robust
SB detection model, and investigate the most fitting
ensemble methods for the SB dataset.
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